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Abstract
This paper presents an empirical account of incentives for underexploiting intellectual property in an open innovation
setting. In this exploratory empirical account the phenomenon is observed in a research, development and innovation
program where participants are required to share intellectual property rights within the consortium. In sum, our argument
is that the observed underexploitation is induced by negative incentives for commercialization that follow from setting a
coercive open innovation regime that will constrain appropriability of IPR. This phenomenon is named so graphically,
because such an event is not only costly in terms of time and resources, but can in fact render IPR effectively worthless
in terms of commercial exploitation and block innovation. This finding is pertinent to policy makers designing research,
development and innovation instruments, as well as for managers who need to make choices how to implement open
practices in innovation. 
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Introduction 
Open innovation (OI) is a name coined and promoted by Chesbrough (2003) for a collection of ideas about 
information exchange and collaboration in innovation, which can be reduced to the main underlying 
argument that if enterprises would collaborate and share knowledge and thus share risk more readily in 
their research, development and innovation (RDI) they would be able to extract more value from their RDI. 
According to recent reviews (Dahlander & Gann, 2010; Huizingh, 2011; West & Bogers, 2011), Open 
innovation research has not focused on the relationship between external environment and open 
innovation benefits. This paper focuses on describing an exploratory empirical account that challenges 
tenets of open innovation.  
The empirical account is from a publicly subsidized center of excellence program
1
 set up to bridge the gap 
between (basic) research and innovation within key industries in Finland. The program has set-up virtual 
centers of excellence that govern bottom-up research programs implemented by co-opetitive
2
 industry-
academia networks. The program features mandated sharing IPR through non-exclusive and free license to 
original IPR within the consortium, forming what might be called a coercive open innovation regime. The 
data were collected from a cross section of industries in Finland during an evaluation of the program 
(Lähteenmäki-Smith et al., 2013). We label the tendency of the partners towards underexploitation of the 
results from open innovation in these networks the ͞reverse tragedy of commons͟ in open innovation. We 
propose that this underexploitation is driven by a set of factors, including organizational incentives, trust, 
and the co-opetitive setting.  
The main contribution of this paper is that it outlines a new phenomenon, that is important both for 
research of innovation, especially in the open innovation research stream, and for business and public 
policy making. The research question is what the antecedents for the reverse tragedy of commons are.  
The observation poses a great challenge for effectiveness of open innovation collaboration. The central 
problem is that the empirical account we present in this paper provides evidence that in fact IPR can 
become effectively worthless in terms of commercial exploitation if it becomes a public good. This finding is 
pertinent especially for designing RDI policy measures that aim to foster collaboration. This paper 
contributes to this nascent stream of research by considering the interplay between industry characteristics 
and open innovation practices. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The second section reviews relevant theoretical discussion to 
outline an explanation to the phenomenon. The third section describes methodology for data collection. 
The fourth section describes the findings, the fifth section presents discussions and the sixth section 
finishes the paper off with concluding remarks.  
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 WĞ ƵƐĞ ƚŚĞ ƚĞƌŵ ͞ĐĞŶƚĞƌ ŽĨ ĞǆĐĞůůĞŶĐĞ͟ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ŐĞŶĞƌŝĐ ƐĞŶƐĞ͕ ŶŽƚ ƚŽ ďĞ ĐŽŶĨƵƐĞĚ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐ ŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞ ŽĨ CĞŶƚƌĞƐ ŽĨ EǆĐĞllence 
e.g. funded by The Academy of Finland. 
2
 ͚CŽ-ŽƉĞƚŝƚŝǀĞ͛ ŝƐ Ă ƉŽƌƚŵĂŶƚeau of the words competitive and cooperative, coined by Nalebuff and Brandenburger (1997). It 
implies that relations between enterprises are not, nor need to be, straightforwardly head-on competitive. Rather, in reality 
competitors in the same industry/market can collaborate on different levels in order to enlarge the market, rather than just try to 
undercut each other to gain a larger share. 
  
The Literature Review 
In this section we discuss two possible explanations for the reverse tragedy of commons. First, we examine 
the relationship between the tragedy of the commons and knowledge as a source of competitive advantage 
of the enterprise. Second, we discuss the so-called first mover advantage and the incentives for exploiting 
public goods commercially. 
Tragedy of commons and knowledge 
In the context of this paper we focus on information or knowledge, and specifically exploitation of 
intellectual property rights (IPRs). Published information or knowledge is essentially a public good in the 
economic sense (Stiglitz, 1999); it is first of all non-excludable in the sense that reproduction of information 
once it is produced is generally cheap through modern communications technology and use of information 
does not exclude others using it insofar it is possible to reproduce the original. It is also non-rivalrous when 
made public, as using and digesting information does not exclude other from doing so. These conditions 
apply especially to codified and public knowledge, i.e. patents, scientific and technical papers and books. 
However, information is not depleted in the same sense as pastures, fisheries or mineral deposits. Resource 
depletion in this context means that IPRs ĂƌĞ ͚ĚĞƉůĞƚĞĚ͛ ďǇ public disclosure and/or spill-over effects 
associated with exploitation, which more or less gradually lead to the information being a public good, and 
thus it no longer is exploitable commercially. Arguments can be made that non-codified and/or 
unpublished information cannot be readily transferred, which is a fair point. However, collaborative RDI 
programs conceivably form a condition where it is difficult not to transfer technical knowledge and other 
signals between the consortium (Bresser, 1988). 
Traditionally enterprises have to a large extent relied on sticky and private information as a source of 
competitive advantage and innovation, however much they collaborate in their RDI and supply chain. 
Especially the resource based view of the firm (RBV) posits that the competitive advantage of an enterprise 
is built on proprietary resources, including tangible physical resource, knowledge, and routines (Amit & 
Schoemaker, 1993; Winter, 2003; Zollo & Winter, 1999). The well know VRIO/N-framework proposes that 
at any given time the competitive position or advantage of an enterprise is based on resources that are 
Valuable, Rare, In-imitable and Organized and/or Non-substitutable, or in other terms excludable and 
rivalrous (e.g. Peteraf & Barney, 2003). Additionally, building on the notion of resources as a basis of 
competitive advantage, it is further proposed that the so-called dynamic capabilities that enable developing 
and exploiting the VRIO resources are the foundation of sustained competitive advantage (Eisenhardt & 
Martin, 2000; Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997; Teece, 2007; Winter, 2003).  
The caveat in RBV is that knowledge is not perfectly appropriable in real conditions and thus the favorable 
competitive position that stems from resources is diminished by competitive imitation and learning 
(Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Kortelainen, Piirainen, Kärkkäinen, & Tuominen, 2011; Peteraf, 1993). Already Teece 
(1986) proposed the seminal notion that when imitation is easy, i.e. when appropriability is low or 
ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ŝƐ Ă ƉƵďůŝĐ ŐŽŽĚ͕ ďĞŶĞĨŝƚƐ ĨƌŽŵ IP‘ ƚĞŶĚ ƚŽ ƐŚŝĨƚ ĨŽƌ ĞŶƚĞƌƉƌŝƐĞƐ ǁŝƚŚ ͚ĐŽŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĂƌǇ ĂƐƐĞƚƐ͛ 
instead of the innovator or inventor, which is consistent with what RBV and FMA literature (see below) 
predict (Finney, Lueg, & Campbell, 2008). Complementary assets in this context are manufacturing and 
supply chain capabilities and bargaining power as well as complementary technologies, products and 
services that support the innovation. Thus it is generally assumed that organized RDI is one of the 
  
mechanisms to replenish resources and ŬĞĞƉ Ă ĨĂǀŽƌĂďůĞ ͚ĂƐƐĞƚ ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ͕͛ ŝ͘Ğ͘ ƐƵƐƚĂŝŶ the competitive 
advantage (Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Kortelainen et al., 2011).  
Thus an enterprise that aims to develop a sustainable competitive advantage has the incentive to 
appropriate its knowledge, at least as far as it is linked to the main value creating activities. On the 
contrary, any attempt to commercialize products or services built on public information risks strong 
competitive response and unpredictable result varying with path dependent complementary assets and 
capabilities (Teece, 1986). In this view, building on a public good is a contradiction in terms. This creates a 
basic tension between the interest to create economic rents by appropriating and leveraging the 
knowledge assets an enterprise possesses and sharing the knowledge for a common good, as once public 
the knowledge becomes a public good and ceases to be a unique source of advantage. However, given a 
strong enough incentive, an enterprise may be compelled to take a risk and share information if it sees that 
the probable return is greater than the probable damage (Simeth & Raffo, 2013). The incentive may be for 
example risk sharing in terms of the uncertainty of the outcomes of RDI activity, as proposed or the 
possibility to tap into new complementary knowledge assets through collaboration (H. W. Chesbrough, 
2003; Enkel, Gassmann, & Chesbrough, 2009). Based on the discussion above, we argue that the risk taking 
is moderated by trust in the partnership as well as the perceived asset position and perceived level of 
capabilities, i.e. the perceived risk and ability to recover.  
First mover advantage and escalation of competition 
The so called first mover advantage (FMA) is the proposition that the first enterprise to introduce a new 
product category to a new market holds a significant advantage over the followers in terms of market share 
and return on investment. An early review of FMA, in consumer product markets, concludes that FMA is 
created by the fact that consumer preferences are shaped by the first innovator around its offering, making 
ŝƚ Ă ƉƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚ ďƌĂŶĚ ĂŶĚ ĐƌĞĂƚŝŶŐ Ă ͚ůŽĐŬ-ŝŶ͛ ĞĨĨĞĐƚ (Robinson, Kalyanaram, & Urban, 1990).  
However, others have labeled FMA as a ͚half-truth͛, as not all market conditions permit acquiring FMA (F. 
Suarez & Lanzolla, 2005). In fact Golder and Tellis show quite convincingly that in most cases the ͚pioneer͛ 
or first mover does not hold an advantage͕ ďƵƚ ƌĂƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĞ ƐĞĐŽŶĚ ŵŽǀĞƌ Žƌ ͚ĞĂƌůǇ ůĞĂĚĞƌ͛ (Golder & Tellis, 
1993; Tellis & Golder, 1996). It is proposed that probability of gaining FMA is most likely in stale markets 
with slow technology progress, but if the market is stable and technology changes fast, FMA is less likely as 
each successive product generation poses the risk that the late movers out-innovate the pioneer. Also 
when markets are changing fast, FMA is less likely even if the technology would be stable, and acquiring it 
may need significant resources. (F. F. Suarez & Lanzolla, 2007) Other studies have shown for example that 
in the context of process innovation (quality improvement) low ‘ΘD ĐŽƐƚ ŵĂǇ ŝŶĚƵĐĞ Ă ͚ƌĂĐĞ͛ ƚŽ ďĞ ƚŚĞ 
ƉŝŽŶĞĞƌ͕ ďƵƚ ǁŚĞŶ ƚŚĞ ĐŽƐƚƐ ĂƌĞ ŚŝŐŚ͕ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ ŵĂǇ ůĞĂĚ ƚŽ Ă ͚ǁĂŝƚŝŶŐ ŐĂŵĞ͛ to seek second-mover 
advantage (Hoppe & Lehmann-Grube, 2001).  
Another aspect to innovation is that it may introduce escalation of competition. To an extent, the 
anticipated return to RDI investment, and commercial rationality of such an investment, depends on the 
ability to harvest rents from the markets. IŶ ŽƚŚĞƌ ǁŽƌĚƐ ͞΀Ă΁ ďŝƚ ŽĨ ŵŽŶŽƉŽůǇ ƉŽǁĞƌ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĨŽƌŵ ŽĨ 
structural cŽŶĐĞŶƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ŝƐ ĐŽŶĚƵĐŝǀĞ ƚŽ ŝŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ŝŶŶŽǀĂƚŝŽŶ͟ (Cadot & Lippman, 1995; orig. Scherer, 
1980). However, when the (possibility of) competition precludes monopoly power or makes it very short 
lived Pacheco-de-Almeida (2010) has proposed that market leaders may displace themselves from 
  
leadership as RDI investments are more risky. Further aversion towards innovation is likely exaggerated by 
high R&D combined with competition, as it raises the risk and innovation may be perceived as a strenuous 
and costly expedition back to the same competitive situation (Hoppe & Lehmann-Grube, 2001).  
The reverse tragedy of commons in open innovation 
To summarize, if we propose that the market-dependent possibility for creating FMA, likelihood of 
escalation of competition and R&D cost may create a disincentive for innovation, effectively creating a 
waiting game where enterprises wait to see if any of the other will commercialize the public IPR, ready to 
ĨŽůůŽǁ ŝĨ ƚŚĞ ĨŝƌƐƚ ŵŽǀĞƌ͛Ɛ ĞĨĨŽƌƚ ŝƐ ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵů͘ BĂƐĞĚ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ůŝƚĞƌĂƚƵƌĞ͕ ƚŚĞ ůŝŬĞůŝŚŽŽĚ ĨŽƌ ƚŚŝƐ ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶ ƌŝƐĞƐ 
when the markets and/or technology are volatile and develop fast, when entry barriers are low and when 
R&D costs are high. The likelihood for escalation of competition, despite negative incentives, rises if the 
competitors are well resourced in terms of knowledge and financial resource and are determined to 
compete each other out. We propose that, while generally it is believed that public goods tend to be 
overexploited, the reverse may be true due to the fact that competition creates ͚ƉĞƌǀĞƌƐĞ͛ ŝŶĐĞŶƚŝǀĞƐ for 
commercialization. More specifically we propose that: 
P1:  the reverse tragedy of commons is enabled by the information and IPR produced in collaboration 
becoming a public good.  
The rationale for the proposition is the discussion on the competitive advantage of the firm and RBV. 
BĂƐŝŶŐ ŽŶĞ͛Ɛ ĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝǀe advantage on a public good is contrary to the tenets of RBV, as a public good by 
definition is not VRIO/N. Further, as public information is easily copied and transferred, one cannot 
appropriate it by trying to privatize the resource. Thus the only advantage would be to develop new 
products faster and try to retain as much of the market as possible through marketing and bargaining 
power. This would then significantly raise the likelihood of competitive escalation. However, based on the 
latter discussion on FMA and escalation of competitions, the likelihood of the reverse tragedy correlates 
positively with the likelihood of competition escalating. Thus we further propose the following:  
P2: the reverse tragedy is exacerbated by risk of escalation of competitions associated with  
P2a: fast moving technology and short product cycles, 
P2b: volatile markets,  
P2c: high R&D cost and 
P2d: an industry that consists of well-resourced enterprises. 
If we examine the second proposition it can be argued that in environs that are already hypercompetitive, 
the second proposition is invalid. However, we argue that the logic holds, because the enterprises do not 
necessarily have an incentive to further escalate competition. However, a more fundamental limitation to 
the propositions is that the underlying assumption is a degree of risk averseness. That is contrary to the 
usual underlying assumption in much of economics that enterprises engage in competition 
straightforwardly without a second thought.  
  
Methodology 3 
Study design 
The methodology for this research is exploratory case study research. Based on the theoretical discussion 
we derive an analysis framework for the cases, following the best practices (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; 
Yin, 2003). Yin (2003) argues that the research design, based on the research problem is the fundamental 
base of the study which guides collecting and interpretation of evidence and providĞƐ Ă ͞ůŽŐŝĐĂů ŵŽĚĞů ŽĨ 
proof that allows the researcher to draw inferences concerning causal relations among the variables under 
ŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ͘͟ The model is elaborated below in table 1. 
Table 1: Elements of research design summarized 
Design elements Questions 
RQs What are the antecedents of the reverse 
tragedy of commons 
Propositions P1:  the reverse tragedy of commons is 
enabled by the information and IPR produced 
in collaboration becoming a public good. 
P2: the reverse tragedy is exacerbated by risk 
of escalation of competitions associated with  
P2a: fast moving technology and short 
product cycles, 
P2b: volatile markets,  
P2c: high R&D cost and 
P2d: an industry that consists of well-
resourced enterprises. 
Unit of analysis Organizational behavior 
Logical link between data and 
propositions 
The observations of behaviors within the 
SHOK program may refute of confirm the 
reverse tragedy 
The interview data may offer further 
explanation to the phenomenon 
Criteria for interpreting 
findings 
If there is observed anomalies in output and 
commercialization from collaborative RDI, 
data conforms with P1. If the opposite is true, 
P1 is refuted. 
If the program participants and characteristics 
of their industries conform with P2, the 
proposition is supported. If the opposite is 
true, P2 is refuted 
 
WĞ ĞǆĂŵŝŶĞ ͚“ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ CĞŶƚƌĞƐ ŽĨ “ĐŝĞŶĐĞ TĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐǇ ĂŶĚ IŶŶŽǀĂƚŝŽŶ͛ ;“HOKƐ4) as cases and conduct 
analysis within and between cases. The data were gathered between May and September 2012 during an 
                                                          
3
 After the COREQ framework for reporting qualitative research (Tong, Sainsbury, & Craig, 2007) 
4
 “HOK ŝƐ Ă FŝŶŶŝƐŚ ĂĐƌŽŶǇŵ͕ ĨƌŽŵ ͚“ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝƐĞŶ HƵŝƉƉƵŽƐĂĂŵŝƐĞŶ KĞƐŬŝƚƚǇŵć͕͛ ůŝƚĞƌĂůůǇ “ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ CĞŶƚĞƌ ŽĨ EǆƉĞƌƚŝƐĞͬEǆĐĞůůĞŶĐĞ 
  
evaluation of the SHOK program, commissioned by the Finnish Funding Agency for Technology and 
Innovation (Tekes). The data collection was executed by a consortium of researchers and consultants, with 
a professional background in innovation systems and RDI policy research and consulting. The dominant 
sampling logic was purposive, more specifically stakeholder and expert sampling (Palys, 2008), in the sense 
that the interviewees were selected based on their assumed ability to give informed answers regarding the 
evaluation questions from different stakeholder groups. The data have been re-examined and re-coded for 
the purposes of this paper to explore the incentives for participation.  
Table 2: Details of data 
Data source Sampling and collection Coding and interpretation 
Documents A documents database of annual reports, monitoring 
data and other relevant materials from the SHOKs 
compiled by Tekes for the purposes of the evaluation. 
 
Semi-structured 
interviews 
A series of interviews with SHOK personnel, 
participants of the research programs and 
stakeholders. 
The responsible evaluator for each SHOK compiled a 
list for interviewees comprising program participants, 
SHOK employees, SHOK board members and 
stakeholders. 
The interviews were semi structured, administered 
either at the interviewees premises/place of work or 
over the phone and noted down in field notes. 
Interviews were conducted until data saturation was 
reached, in practice between May and Spetember 
2012 
The data was coded by each SHOKs 
responsible investigator. 
A cross-sectional panel 
survey 
The survey explored the expectations, perceptions and 
experiences with the SHOK instrument among the 
companies and research organizations involved.  
The sample was compiled from the project database of 
Tekes, complemented by the contact details made 
available by the SHOKs. The database was built on the 
Tekes and Academy of Finland databases and 
complemented with contacts from the SHOKs, 
representing their project and program participants, 
key stakeholders and members of governance bodies. 
Pre-test was done between 1st and 4th of June, with 
the questionnaires adapted in the following week and 
implemented between the 11th and 21st June, with an 
extension to the 29th June.  
The survey targeted two separate groups First, the 
representatives of companies and research 
organizations with a position allowing judging the 
strategic significance and the possible linkages 
between SHOK strategy and the strategy of the 
organization in question. And, second, all participants 
with experience of SHOK program / project activity.  
Together the surveys gauged the views of over 2000 
persons, with the activity survey achieving 1580 
responses (27% response rate) and the strategic 
survey 676 (25% response rate). 
 
Group interviews A series of group interviews conducted during a series 
of peer review panel meetings (each made up of 5 
experts, with the facilitated by consultants) 
The interviews were lead by the five-person panels 
 
  
composed of leading academics in the field of the 
SHOKs invited by Tekes and the Academy of Finland 
The interviewees were SHOK program managers and 
participants 
Empirical context5 
Background and program context 
According to Lähteenmäki-Smith et al. (2013) the background of SHOKs is on one hand in a 2004 study 
ĐŽůůŽƋƵŝĂůůǇ ŬŶŽǁŶ ĂƐ ͞ƚŚĞ GůŽďĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ ‘ĞƉŽƌƚ͟ ǁŚŝĐŚ ŽƵƚůŝŶĞƐ ƚŚĞ opportunities and challenges for 
Finland in the Global Economy, and on another in the perceived need to keep developing the Finnish 
innovation system; that is institutions and policy instruments, to support continuous knowledge based 
growth. The aims for the program include establishing public-private partnerships to speeding up 
innovation processes and renewing the Finnish industrial clusters by creating new expertise and achieving 
an enhanced level of internationally competitive competence, as well as radical innovations. The program is 
expected create new patterns of cooperation, co-creation and interaction.  
Currently there are six SHOKs in operation: CLEEN Ltd (in the environment, energy ĂŶĚ ͚ĐůĞĂŶƚĞĐŚ͛ 
industry), FIMECC Ltd (in the machinery industry), SalWe Oy (in health and well-being), DIGILE (in the ICT 
and digital services industry, previously known as TIVIT) RYM Ltd (in the built environment/construction 
industry) and Finnish Bioeconomy Cluster FIBIC Ltd (forest-based industry, previously Forest Cluster Ltd.).  
Overview to program output 
Between 2008 and September 2012, Tekes funded the SHOKs and their programs with a total of over 343 
MEUR. An average of 40% of the research conducted in the SHOKs is, or will be, co-funded by the 
companies involved. Thus the SHOK program has become one of the main instruments of Finnish 
ŝŶŶŽǀĂƚŝŽŶ ƉŽůŝĐǇ ĂŶĚ ƉĞƌŚĂƉƐ ĞǀĞŶ ŝƚƐ ͚ĨůĂŐƐŚŝƉ͛ ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ůĂƐƚ ĨŝǀĞ ǇĞĂƌƐ͘ 
The program intended to create open innovation platforms, bridging disciplines, industrial areas as well as 
basic and applied research and resulting in both excellence in research and create a bridge for transferring 
the research excellence to applied research, development and innovation in enterprises. When measured 
and assessed quantitatively in their Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) and qualitatively, measured with the 
participants experiences and satisfaction, it was obvious that in most SHOKs the collaboration had 
remained between the previous confines and in established fora. Amongst the long list of SHOK KPIs 
(around 20 reported in total), the commercialization activities were relatively modest. The highest achiever 
in terms of the number of invention announcements and patents secured, FIBIC reported a total 34, while 
the highest number of licenses sold was reported by FIMECC (46). Extremely few spin-offs were reported, 3 
ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĐĂƐĞ ŽĨ FIMECC ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚŝŶŐ ͞ďĞƐƚ-in-cůĂƐƐ͟ ŝŶ ƚŚŝƐ ƌĞŐĂƌĚ͘ 
Judging by the program volume, the activities have produced relatively few commercial outputs and the 
objective for new business benefits was only partly met. In terms of IPR sharing within the open innovation 
regime, few new actors and stakeholders had been involved in the consortia, there were very few signs of 
transgressions in terms of IPR, and yet the trust did not seem to be sufficient to achieve really open 
exchange of ideas and IPR.  
                                                          
5
 The description of empirical context is based on (Lähteenmäki-Smith et al., 2013) 
  
Terms and Conditions for the Coercive Open Innovation Regime 
One of the interesting features in of the SHOK program is that seems to be built on an ideal of open 
innovation. As Tekes is by far the largest public funder for the SHOK programs and during the period of the 
data collection, all the research programs had used Tekes funding we use the general terms and conditions 
(hereon forwards T&C, ͞GĞŶĞƌĂů TĞƌŵƐ ĂŶĚ CŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶ ĨŽƌ “HOK ‘ĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ PƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞ FƵŶĚŝŶŐ͕͟ ϮϬϭϮͿ as a 
surrogate to outline the coercive open innovation regime.  
The novel feature of the SHOK model is that while the material and immaterial rights remain with the 
inventor, the T&C mandate an unlimited and perpetual access right to the results and IPR to all participants 
of the program. Further, the access rights will cover all companies within the same group of companies as 
the participant of the research program. If a participant leaves the program, its access right to IPR will 
remain in force, but it will lose preferential treatment in access to background or results materials owned 
by other participants. There is in principle open access to results and IPR, shared by all parties involved in 
the research (program, project or task). In case of a public sector participant, title and ownership is retained 
if the entity has generated the results while subcontracting for enterprises. The inventor has the right to 
protect its IPR, but has to bear the associated costs.  
Additionally, all the results are published according to the T&C. The consortium has the possibility choose 
between wide or limited publicity model, which will affect the fraction of cost eligible for public funding. In 
the wide publicity model all the participants shall release all results of the program, including description of 
work and results materials, such as laboratory diaries, measurement results or source codes, and scientific 
background necessary to implement the program. Under limited publicity model, research organizations 
will have to publish all results, while enterprises will have to publish only project/work package name, 
amount of public funding, research intensity and an overview to the substance and results. The exceptions 
to the rule of publicity are that immediate publication may be delayed for e.g. reasonable period to allow 
ĨŽƌ ƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶ ďǇ ƌĞŐŝƐƚĞƌŝŶŐ IP‘ Žƌ ŝŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĂů ƌŝŐŚƚƐ ŝĨ ƉƵďůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ŝƐ ŝŶ ĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ŽǁŶĞƌƐ ͞ĚŝƌĞĐƚ͕ 
ůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂƚĞ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ͘͟ PƵďůŝcity of the results is also subject to case by case consideration in individual cases 
ĨŽƌ ͞ĞǆƚƌĞŵĞůǇ ƉƌĞƐƐŝŶŐ ƌĞĂƐŽŶƐ͘͟ 
T&C in effect set up a coercive open innovation regime, in the sense that the consortium members cannot 
choose what to share if they want to participate in the programs. One can argue that the regime is not 
coercive as participation is voluntary, but the sheer volume of available funds and the fact that the 
ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ͛Ɛ ůĞĂĚŝŶŐ ĞŶƚĞƌƉƌŝƐĞƐ Ăůů ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚĞ ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐ Ă ǀĞƌǇ ƐƚƌŽŶŐ ŝŶĐĞŶƚŝǀĞ ƚŽ Ɖarticipate at least in name 
only to monitor the activity.  
Description of cases 
The relatively meager output of the program poses the question what is the underlying mechanism that 
explains this poor performance. As we discussed above, we propose to explore the behaviors that lead to 
this poor performance. The longest running SHOKs are Finnish Bioeconomy Ltd. that represents forest-
based industries since 2007 and DIGILE that represents IT and telecom since 2008.  
The common features that are pertinent to this analysis are that SHOK research programs were, at the time 
of the data collection, large (up to 4 year in duration and budgeted up to 20MEUR per year) and included 
broad-based co-opetitive (up to 20 participants) consortia. Further, the research programs were based on 
Strategic Research Agenda created through a consensus process and approved before funding application 
  
by a Board of Directors that consists of key industry players and academics. The key differences are related 
to industry and SHOK governance, which will be explained below case by case.  
Case A: FIBIC 
Forestcluster Ltd (FIBIC from 07/2012) is the SHOK of the Finnish forest industry cluster. It was founded in 
2007 as the first SHOK with the idea of renewing the forest cluster by new forms of networking and 
boosting high quality research and innovation.  
Unlike in the fields of many other SHOKs, in forest industry the cluster and its value chains have existed a 
long time, key constituents are multinational enterprises, research infrastructures and professorships exist, 
research traditions are strong and research funding considerable. The key challenges in forest industry are 
related to the profitability of the existing industry and secondly to the renewal of the forest sector, 
business reorientation and consequently research reorientation.  
The practical work has been carried out through three sets of research programs: one set of programs 
aimed at rapid results in incremental research of traditional forest industry, whereas the second set 
pursued towards the new concept of future biorefining. The third program set is an umbrella for marketing 
and business model innovations. 
Due to the structure of the sector and the age of FIBIC, the research has already advanced to a point where 
there are tangible results in the form of ideas, invention reports, publications and patents. However, at the 
moment there is no clear pathway for these results out of the programs. In the analysis conducted for the 
evaluation of FIBIC (Lähteenmäki-Smith et al., 2013), the utilization of the results was seen highly 
problematic due to IPR issues by almost every company interviewee.  
Many of the industry interviewees were of the opinion that because of common rights to results, there is 
no incentive for companies to commercialize the results, and there is a serious threat that many of the 
results obtained in the programs will not be taken further. This is exactly the reverse tragedy of commons 
that is enabled by commonly produced IPR becoming a public good (P1).  
It can even be stated that in the radical renewal sector of the industry (biorefining etc.) four out of five 
factors proposed to exacerbate the reverse tragedy, hold, namely: 
 Technology is moving fast (P2a) 
 Markets are highly volatile (P2b) 
 R&D costs are high (P2d) 
 Enterprises are, on the average, well resourced (P2e). 
A further explaining factor for the situation is the total absence of first mover advantage. First, forest 
companies are reluctant to commit to new technologies and products as the markets are still unclear. A 
better strategy is to wait and see how the rival will succeed. Chemical and equipment suppliers, on the 
other hand, cannot exploit the FMA since they do not even know what their clients wish to produce in the 
future.  
They also hold for new productions methods and products in the conventional forest industry, like 
nanocellulose and foam forming. For incremental development in conventional fields, only P2e and partly 
P2d are accentuated.  
  
Besides the reverse tragedy of commons, the situation also has other consequences. First, unclearly 
perceived and unresolved IPR issues also hinder new openings in interesting matters ʹ companies do the 
research rather by themselves. In the interviews there was clear evidence that due to common exploitation 
of the results, most important topics from the competitive edge point of view are not brought to the 
common table. Consequently, heavy competition over the best available research resources takes place 
behind the scenes. This competition naturally affects also SHOK research since best groups cannot 
necessarily participate in common research programs.  
Second, the situation drives the research easily from pre-competitive to commercializable research. 
Namely, the results of pre-commercial research produce competitive effects in companies only with a 
certain probability and a lag of several years. Company representatives, especially those lower in value 
chains, seem to find it increasingly difficult to justify the SHOK activities to their top management as year 
after year there are no tangible results.  Therefore, proving the true relevance of the results inside the 
company is difficult, and the temptation to move to applied research is evident. This exacerbates the 
reverse tragedy of commons further. 
To summarize, it was stressed by numerous interviewees that IPR issues are a major obstacle for the 
possible commercialization of results. The fact that results are usable by every programme partner 
indefinitively means that there is no incentive for commercialization. Some promising results may even 
become not utilized. The problems are accentuated by the diminishing number of companies in the 
business. On the other hand, it is possible that companies see the added value of the SHOK too narrowly, 
being only the IPR.  
Finally, it should be noted that these conclusions are most likely not in any relation to how FIBIC has been 
ŵĂŶĂŐĞĚ͘ TŚĞǇ ƐĞĞŵ ƚŽ ƌĞůĂƚĞ ŵŽƌĞ ƚŽ FIBIC͛Ɛ ŵĂƚƵƌŝƚǇ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞ ĂŶĚ ĐǇĐůĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐ͘ HĞŶĐĞ͕ 
unless the reverse tragedy of commons is somehow resolved, similar challenges will most likely be finally 
met in all of the other SHOKs, too.  
  
  
Table 3: Summary on interviews 
Informant/source Statements relevant IPR, incentives 
and commercialization 
Emerging themes 
Large forest enterprises 
 Once a research program is running, how 
does one spin out common IPR? These 
difficulties may prove critical as companies 
want to have results for themselves. 
 Truly interesting research is done by 
companies themselves 
 Behind the scenes, there is fierce rivalry on 
best research resources.. 
 Clear IPR underutilization and its 
possible consequences: 
 Lack of commitment 
 Avoiding truly interesting topics in 
common research 
 
Chemical and equipment suppliers 
 Shok concept has proven less efficient 
than expected 
 Real development is not brought into Fibic 
but is done elsewhere 
 IPR issues are a nightmare and bottleneck 
No1. Common ownership of results does 
not work. 
 This also reflects to general commitment, 
as the concept must be sold internally to 
the top management each year.  
 Too much openness hinders 
commercialization which is, per se, the 
most difficult part.  
Academia 
 They do not see the IPR as an issue ʹ but 
have been forced to learn the rules so as 
not to break them. 
 Protection by publishing [which in fact 
worsens the situation] 
 Companies do not bring topics relevant to 
competitive edge into Fibic 
FIBIC 
 Cartel history one significant source of 
challenges in the level of cooperation 
 Companies are reluctant to tell what they 
really do 
 There are IPR issues. One should develop a 
mechanism how to utilize patents and 
invention reports arising from common 
research. Free license to utilize does not 
work.  
 The step from research programme to 
company based activities is difficult 
Panel meetings, five senior 
researchers, interviewing SHOK 
managers, program directors, 
researchers and boards members in 
separate sessions. (Altogether 
approximately 20 interviewees plus 5 
panelists) 
 It is not clear how to move from pre-
competitive to competitive research 
objectives within the FIBIC SHOK 
 The IPR issues seem not to have been 
resolved completely. 
 
  
  
Case B: DIGILE 
At the time of the data collection DIGILE, then TIVIT, was running six programs with similar consortia made 
up of enterprises large and small and research institutes. The distinguishing feature in DIGILE is that each 
program has its own Strategic Research Agenda it aims to implement. (for details of the programs, please 
refer to the publicly available evaluation report Lähteenmäki-Smith et al., 2013) 
The first finding is that the DIGILE programs have produced relatively few IPRs compared to other public 
RDI interventions of the same volume. In the case of DIGILE for example, the preceding Tekes program for 
the IT and telecom industry has a similar volume and runtime, and produced a considerably larger amount 
ŽĨ IP‘Ɛ͘ TŚĞ “HOK ĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝŽŶ ŶŽƚĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ͞TĞŬĞƐ ƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐǇ ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞ ͛GIGA ʹ CŽŶǀĞƌŐŝŶŐ NĞƚǁŽƌŬƐ͛ 
(2005ʹ2010)63, GIGA had a similar volume (Tekes funding to the program was 99 MEUR out of total 
279MEUR volume, that is 20MEUR per year, roughly equivalent to [DIGILE, formerly TIVIT] funding from 
Tekes) and many of the same actors as [DIGILE], yet it produced more outputs than [DIGILE] for the same 
funding; during its six years GIGA programme resulted in excess of one thousand patents, and some of the 
largest enterprise projects alone generated up to one hundred patents, while TIVIT research has resulted in 
ĨŝǀĞ ŝŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ĚŝƐĐůŽƐƵƌĞƐ ĂŶĚ ƉĂƚĞŶƚƐ ŝŶ ϮϬϭϭ ĂŶĚ ϮϬϭϮ͘͟ (Lähteenmäki-Smith et al., 2013, p. 186)  
The main explanation offered for this observation was that SHOK program was set to bridge the gap 
between academia and industry, and thus the bulk of the RDI activities would be in the precompetitive and 
pre IPR registration phase. However, the DIGILE documents, and interviewees across the board from within 
DIGILE itself to stakeholders indicated that the programs are innovation-oriented as opposed to research 
focused. Further, the program participants indicated that they knew of cases where enterprises ran private 
self-funded or publicly subsidized RDI programs to develop innovations based on the ideas from the actual 
SHOK programs. Thus the explanation in internally conflicting and supports the suggestion that there are 
incentive problems.  
In general if we look at DIGILE, the propositions are to a large extent supported, as:  
 Technology is moving fast (P2a) 
 Markets are volatile (P2b) 
 R&D costs are high (P2d) 
 Several well-resourced enterprises are involved (P2e). 
However, in DIGILE we cannot find a clear cut case of the reverse tragedy of the commons. While not a 
direct support to the phenomenon, it provides reinforcement to the notion that the coercive open 
innovation regime does pose incentive problems for the enterprises. The response of the perceived 
challenge posed by T&C in terms of IPR are handle by faux-collaborative behaviors in the programs. The 
interviews suggest that the programs exhibit one or several of the following behaviors; nominal investment 
to a program or participation-in-name-ŽŶůǇ͕ ǁŚŽ ĂƌĞ ƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚ ďǇ ŽƚŚĞƌ ƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐ ĂƐ ͚TƌŽũĂŶ ŚŽƌƐĞƐ͛ 
installed to acquire interesting IPR; staffing the collaborative project with second tier RDI employees; and 
running private parallel projects to enable private elaboration of interesting research directions in an 
appropriable format. 
  
Table 4: Summary on interviews 
Informant/source Statements relevant IPR, 
incentives and 
commercialization 
Emerging themes 
DIGILE  
 Programs have a position in creating 
platforms/scalable ecosystems 
 IPRs less sensitive as activities focused 
outside daily business 
 IPRs are more sensitivite for small-to-
medium enterprises (SMEs), which may 
depend on one invention 
 The T&C that set-up a coercive open 
innovation regime pose perverse 
incentives for both registering IPR and 
commercialization 
 The issue is sensitive for SMEs, because 
they rely on narrow IPR base, and for 
large enterprises because of the risk 
unwanted spill overs 
 The competing interests for research 
agenda and co-opetitive relationships 
within consortia amplify the IPR issue 
 
Funding organizations 
 Suggestions that the programs serve as 
a venue for idea exchange and RDI is 
done privately 
 There is a risk that large (multinational) 
enterprises gather IPRs and spread 
them around 
Large enterprises 
 T&C for IPR is challenge for committing 
enterprises 
 The T&C are a strong disincentive for 
contributing to the RDI, the present 
terms do not allow any appropriability 
 The model does not handle competing 
interests in the consortium; works as 
long the consortium is aligned behind 
one interest 
 The terms inhibit especially SME 
participation 
RDI director and SHOK program 
participants (2 persons), SME software 
and service 
 Large enterprises dominate the 
agenda, every participant have their 
own agendas, programs are focused on 
things that would not be developed 
otherwise (non-core RDI) 
 Freeloading is common in the 
programs (participants commit in name 
only, with a few working days to 
monitor programs and get a license to 
whatever IPR emerges) 
 Commercialization is challenging duo 
to the joint venture ʹnature of RDI 
Academia 
 The SHOKs operate uncomfortably 
close to commercialization, enterprises 
do not share their best ideas and 
efforts in the programs 
 IPRs are a constant source of friction in 
the programs 
Panel meetings, five senior researchers, 
interviewing SHOK managers, program 
directors, researchers and boards 
members in separate sessions. 
(Altogether approximately 20 
interviewees plus 5 panelists) 
 The panel concluded based on hearings 
that IPR registration, if not creation 
was substantially hampered by 
mandatory IPR sharing 
 
  
Cross Case Analysis and Findings 
Output of the program  
These findings suggest that there is an incentive problem for producing IPR and/or commercializing the 
results of the collaborative RDI. The finding that coercive open innovation regime introduces perverse 
incentives for participation is robust across the examined cases. However, as we have observed, the 
information-as-a-public-good problem has not created a reverse tragedy of the commons in all the SHOKs. 
In the case of DIGILE, the ͚waiting game͛ has been avoided as the partners have engaged in their own side 
projects to commercialize aspects of the collaborative research. It seems that FIBIC stakeholders adhere 
more strictly to the letter and spirit of the Terms and Conditions of the program, and thus have run into the 
incentive problem head on. 
One explanation for the difference between the SHOKs may be that the balance of power in the programs. 
The DIGILE programs for the period have been generally built around a lead enterprise i.e. a network 
engine, according to the interviews, and the individual programs do not involve large enterprises which are 
in direct competition. On the contrary several of the FIBIC programs involve large multinational enterprises 
who are in direct competition in their core business areas and their mutual suppliers and technology 
partners. It seems that in this case, the major drivers for the reverse tragedy of the commons are the co-
opetitive relationship between the enterprises and the resulting first mover advantage problem. We may 
go so far as to suggest that the risk of the tragedy of the commons invokes the reverse tragedy. The more 
ŵŽĚĞƌĂƚĞ ŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ͞ƚƌĂŐĞĚǇ͟ ŝŶ DIGILEƐ ĐĂƐĞ ĐĂŶ ďĞ ĂůƐŽ ƉĂƌƚůǇ ĂƚƚƌŝďƵƚĞĚ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƌƐ ƚŽ 
circumvent the IPR problem.  
Other explanations for the differences between SHOKs may be path dependence, general perception of risk 
and ability to take risk. First, IT industry is generally more RDI intensive that forest-based industries, 
technology and product/service cycles are shorter and new businesses are created more often. Second 
related factor is risk perception and magnitude, namely taking for example programs Future Biorefinery 
(FIBIC) and Future Innovative Services (DIGILE) the investment to commercializing the concepts developed 
and tested in RDI differs by not one, but by two or even several, orders of magnitude.  
Based on these findings, we argue that the features of the programs are one facet of explanation, as the co-
opetetitive setting together with the coercive open innovation regime creates disincentives for 
commercialization. In essence we argue that as the consortium members have an unlimited access to the 
IPR, even if it would be owned by a single partner or a group of partners, any attempt to commercialize 
inventions would require additional investments with a risk of failure. Further as noted in the case of FIBIC, 
is that even though IPR transfer would be possible, the clause that such transaction should be made at 
͞ŵĂƌŬĞƚ ƉƌŝĐĞ͟ ŝƐ ƋƵŝƚĞ ƚƌŝĐŬǇ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĐĂƐĞ ŽĨ ƌĞally new innovations as there might not be a market to 
determine the price.  
Industry characteristics 
As discussed, the so-called first mover advantage depends on market and technology change, and any first 
mover especially in a totally new business area faces a large risk of failing altogether and in any case bears 
the significant cost of trying to create a market. However, if one partner would try and succeed in creating 
a proven new business or product category, there is a significant risk that other consortium members 
follow with competing product to share the market. These followers first of all benefit from the first movers 
  
efforts to create a new segment, and secondly they can benchmark the initially dominant design and 
improve based on initial customer experience.  
In the case of FIBIC the forest-based cluster and its value chains have existed a long time, key players are 
large multinational enterprises, research infrastructures and academic seats exist, research traditions are 
strong (but traditionally rather efficiency related RDI topics than creation of new business areas due to the 
fierce competition in the traditional forest industry markets) and investments to RDI are considerable. This 
also indicates that the core technology and business are mature. In this sense, the role of the SHOK is 
fundamentally different compared to younger industries: whereas these SHOKs even have to struggle with 
cluster formation and research infrastructure creation, the key challenges in forest industry are related to 
the profitability of the existing core business and secondly to the renewal of the forest sector, business 
reorientation and consequently research reorientation. TŚĞ ŵĂƚƵƌŝƚǇ ŽĨ ŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇ ŵŝŐŚƚ ŝŶĚŝĐĂƚĞ Ă ͚ƐƚĂůĞ͛ 
situation where first mover advantage would be attainable in principle, but in even in FIBICs case there are 
really new or radical concepts, especially in the Future Biorefinery project, which exhibits significant 
technological and market risk, creating a perfect storm of circumstances to introduce Ă ͚ǁĂŝƚŝŶŐ ŐĂŵĞ͛ 
between the partners.  
Table 5: Market analysis 
Market factors that risk 
escalation of competition 
FIBIC DIGILE 
Main target market for the RDI 
outputs 
Bio-based products, including 
ůŝƋƵŝĚ ĨƵĞůƐ ͞bio-ĨƵĞůƐ͟ 
Digital business and consumer 
services, digital service 
infrastructures 
P2a: fast moving technology, 
short product cycle 
Bio-technology is science-based 
and R&D intensive. R%D cycle is 
long, but move relatively fast 
compared to the industry 
standard 
Historically technology 
development has been fast 
P2b: volatile markets  The market size is hard to predict, 
however it is assumed to be 
growing 
Overall the market for IT is 
growing steadily, fast changes 
within and between segments 
P2c: high R&D cost Moderate-high R&D cost, high 
investment cost 
Moderate R&D cost, low to 
moderate investment in digital 
services 
P2d: well-resourced enterprises Many large multinational 
enterprises 
Large multinational enterprises, 
SMEs 
 
 
  
  
Discussions 
To summarize the findings, both of the examined cases exhibit traits that support the rise of the reverse 
tragedy of commons. Our argument in essence is that when an open innovation network shares IPRs for all 
RDI results and there is a risk for escalation of competition, the incentives may rĞƐƵůƚ ŝŶ Ă ͚ƐƚĂůĞŵĂƚĞ͛ Žƌ Ă 
͚ǁĂŝƚŝŶŐ ŐĂŵĞ͛ ǁŚĞƌĞ ƚŚĞ ƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐ ĂƌĞ ĂǀĞƌƐĞ ƚŽǁĂƌĚ ĐŽŵŵĞƌĐŝĂůŝǌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ƌĞƐƵůƚƐ ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ŽĨ ĞǆƉĞĐƚĞĚ ůŽǁ 
return on risk. The empirical findings are that the coercive open innovation regime creates a condition 
where IPRs are effectively public goods, at least within the consortium, which in turn creates a disincentive 
for producing IPR in the first place, and commercializing it. Also the market conditions in both cases 
conform to the propositions for conditions where the reverse tragedy may arise. However the two cases 
differ slightly in their response to these conditions. We propose that that the difference may be explained 
by consortium characteristics. Comparing FIBIC and DIGILE, in the latter case the programs have less equally 
strong direct competitors, and there are more indications of behaviors to circumvent the reverse tragedy.  
The alternative explanations for this behavior might be e.g. difficulties of overcoming organizational inertia, 
e.g. the not invented here ʹsyndrome, integrating the RDI results to internal RDI, strategic alignment 
between consortium research and internal RDI and corporate strategy (e.g. Dahlander & Gann, 2010; West 
& Bogers, 2011; West & Gallagher, 2006). This exploratory account cannot comprehensively rule out all 
alternative explanation, but the findings presented above suggest that the IPR appropriability is the major 
explanation, as the enterprises engage in behaviors to appropriate the results and while the IPR issues 
arose as a major theme in the interviews, there we not indications that organizational inertia would be the 
reason for not commercializing.  
An acid test for the findings is to ask the question ͞why would rational decision makers enter into the 
agreement knowing the terms and conditions, and then not reap the benefit for the investment to RDI?͟ 
One explanation for this seemingly unrational behavior lays the development path of the program. In the 
interviews of officials who were knowledgeable of the founding of the program indicated that the program 
and the T&C took shape after initial commitment. The decision makers operated with the best knowledge 
they had at the time while the instruments was still shaping, not necessarily possessing full knowledge of 
ǁŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ŝŶƐƚƌƵŵĞŶƚ ƚƵƌŶĞĚ ŽƵƚ ƚŽ ďĞ͘ ͚PƌŽŵŝƐĞƐ ǁĞƌĞ ŵĂĚĞ͛ ĂŶĚ ƐŽ ĨŽƌƚŚ ĂŶĚ͕ ĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁƐ͕ 
the notification of the funding instrument in European Commission
6
 was not an easy one and has likely had 
an impact to the T&C. Another, related explanation is in the national context the exceptional (originally 
intended and later largely realized) funding volume and commitment of several industry players have likely 
created a strong pressure to join the program, ŶŽƚ ƵŶůŝŬĞ ƚŚĞ ͚ĨĞĞĚŝŶŐ ĨƌĞŶǌǇ͛ ĨŽƌ ďŝŽƚĞĐŚ ŝŶ ĞĂƌůǇ ϮϬϬϬƐ 
(DeFrancesco, 2003). Thus it is likely these circumstances have created a situation where enterprises have 
committed to an agreement before knowing exactly what the exact terms would be, paving the way to the 
observed dilemma.  
Additional factors that have induced commitment to the SHOK program are illuminated by the interviews. 
One is an observed attitude that because in the circumstances described above the key enterprises from 
the respective industries ĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĚ ĞĂƌůǇ͕ ŽƚŚĞƌƐ ͞ĐŽƵůĚ ŶŽƚ ĂĨĨŽƌĚ͟ ŶŽƚ ƚŽ ũŽŝŶ ƚŚĞ ŶĞƚǁŽƌŬ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĨĞĂƌ ƚŚĂƚ 
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others can develop a competitive edge. Another is that one of the fundamental objectives for the SHOK 
program was to bridge scientific research and commercial development, and some participants were 
genuinely hopeful to get a competitive advantage through new RDI initiatives and networks. .Thirdly we 
may hypothesize that the sheer volume of funding in itself acted as an incentive as well. Typically it seems 
that the SMEs and less RDI intensive enterprises have joined for the first reason, while some of the large 
enterprises primarily for the latter two.  
Another acid test is to ask the ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ͞ĂƌĞ ƚŚĞ ƌĞƐƵůƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ‘DI ƉƌŽũĞĐƚƐ ƚƌƵůǇ ǀĂůƵĂďůĞ͍͟ We have 
interpreted the findings from the cases with the assumption that the RDI investment has resulted in 
commercially valuable outputs. The self-reported data support the proposition that the outputs are 
valuable. However, the additional question is that are they valuable enough compared to the 
counterfactual situation where the same knowledge would have been created in private RDI. Namely, 
based on the theoretical discussion, we can hypothesize that co-owned or open RDI would have to be more 
valuable than private precisely because it is open and thus the risk/return equation is unbalanced from a 
commercial point of view. We can propose additionally that when it comes to commercializing the results 
there might be organizational friction in implementing inbound open innovation͕ ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ͚ŶŽƚ 
ŝŶǀĞŶƚĞĚ ŚĞƌĞ͛-syndrome, lack of absorptive capacity or search routines and processes to integrate outside 
knowledge to internal RDI (Chiaroni, Chiesa, & Frattini, 2010; Dahlander & Gann, 2010; Spithoven, Clarysse, 
& Knockaert, 2011) or just common timing in view of corporate strategy and existing RDI pipeline. 
However, these factors do not overturn the reverse tragedy of commons, but rather illuminate another 
path to finding an explanation for it in the organizational behavior. 
Further reinforcement for the empirical account can be found from similar or adjacent conclusions 
presented by Annala and Ylä-Jääski (2011a, 2011b), who evaluated the SHOKs under the auspices of the 
Confederation of the Finnish Technology Industries (Teknologiateollisuus), and concluded that handling IPR 
in broad-based SHOK consortia is a challenge and to some extent inhibits participation. The alternative 
responses to these challenges they observed include also non-participation altogether especially in projects 
that run close to core business or core competence, in addition to the ones discussed above. These findings 
reinforce conclusions about the incentive problem posed by the coercive open innovation regime, i.e. 
mandated IPR sharing.  
The present research has, until quite recently (e.g. Felin & Zenger, 2013), scarcely recognized the 
relationship between appropriability conditions and nature of technological and market change and 
benefits from open innovation. West and Bogers (2011) ŐŽ ĂƐ ĨĂƌ ĂƐ ǁƌŝƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĂƚ ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ŽŶ ͞potential 
moderators of inbound open innovation success is almost non-ĞǆŝƐƚĞŶƚ͟ ĂĨƚĞƌ ĐŽŶĚƵĐƚŝŶŐ ĂŶ ĞǆƚĞŶƐŝǀĞ 
review of the published literature. The bulk of open innovation research has concentrated on describing 
open innovation instances through historical or cross-sectional analysis of collaboration and particularly on 
ƚŚĞ ďĞŶĞĨŝƚ Žƌ ƉƌŽŵŝƐĞ ŽĨ ŽƉĞŶ ŝŶŶŽǀĂƚŝŽŶ͕ ĂŶĚ ůĂƚĞůǇ ĂůƐŽ ĚĞĨŝŶŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ͚ƌŝĐŚ͛ ďƵƚ ǀĂŐƵĞ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ ŽĨ ŽƉĞŶ 
innovation (Dahlander & Gann, 2010; Huizingh, 2011; West & Bogers, 2011). The aggregate findings are 
that open innovation, especially inbound open innovation i.e. acquisition of knowledge and resources from 
partners provides leverage for internal RDI, but outbound open innovation, i.e. revealing or licensing, 
happens when an enterprise cannot commercialize or otherwise utilize the IPR (Dahlander & Gann, 2010; 
Leiponen & Helfat, 2010). Our findings are more related to governance of (Felin & Zenger, 2013) and 
incentives for open innovation (Simeth & Raffo, 2013).  
  
Even though the findings of benefits from open innovation seem to be robust across different contexts (H. 
Chesbrough & Brunswicker, 2013; Dahlander & Gann, 2010; Laursen & Salter, 2006; van de Vrande, de 
Jong, Vanhaverbeke, & de Rochemont, 2009), based on this exploratory account, it seems that at least 
incentives to engage in open collaboration depend on these industry conditions and it is likely that the 
impact of opening up innovation will as well. The implication to research is that the industry conditions may 
moderate the benefits of opening up innovation process and affect what are the optimal forms of open 
innovation. 
While one cannot readily derive what ought to be from what is, the main implication to practice would be 
to consider the external industry conditions side by side the internal conditions of technology path, 
absorptive capacity, integration of external knowledge and other facets of managing open innovation (Felin 
& Zenger, 2013; van de Vrande et al., 2009; West & Bogers, 2011) when deciding how to engage in open 
innovation. Similar findings have been presented by Simeth and Raffo (2013) who examined Open Science
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practices and concluded that appropriability regime is an important consideration when deciding on 
disclosure.  
These findings and their direct implications are of course primarily limited to coercive open innovation 
regimes set up by RDI or industrial policy. In purely voluntary industrial networks these behaviors are less 
likely. However there may be special cases where some of the observed behaviors may arise in voluntary 
open innovation as well, we propose that if one enterprise is substantially larger than its network partners 
ĂŶĚ ŽƚŚĞƌƐ ͞cannot afford͟ ŶŽƚ ƚŽ ĚĞĂů ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ŶĞƚǁŽƌŬ ĞŶŐŝŶĞ.  
As for the implications to practice or policy, the problem is that substantial resources, time, money, human 
resources, are committed to activity that does not lead to innovation and thus the partnership may actually 
hinder the industry in the short to medium term. Further, in the examined cases the outputs of research 
are not completely public goods outside the consortium, they are still exclusive for outsiders, which makes 
the problem all the deeper as the partial appropriability excludes the outputs from public consumption and 
thus negates positive externalities. Thus the first implication primarily for policy is that while setting up 
open innovation regime is a worthy goal, there are severe challenges. The immediate alternatives would be 
either completely open of closed models.  
In completely open model, where all results materials are public, the externalities are the greatest even if 
there would be the least direct impact. However, going back to the discussion on competitive advantage, it 
may be unrealistic to expect industry participation on completely open innovation networks and the 
participants would have all the less incentive to conduct core research in an completely open program and 
further to commercialize the research outputs. In fact we may suggest that the traditional system of public 
research and private R&D constitutes such an environment in the broad sense and it has been generally 
recognized that the IPRs that are public goods are not effectively utilized by the industry.  
In the other end of the spectrum, closed consortia organized around one value chain are likely the most 
effective in terms of impact as the incentives are best aligned for collaboration and commercialization. 
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 Open Science in general is a concept similar to open innovation, but applied to the scientific field, aimed to promote transparency 
of research and public dissemination, including practices such as data sharing and sharing of primary record of resĞĂƌĐŚ ͚ŽƉĞŶ 
ŶŽƚĞďŽŽŬ ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ͛ ĂƐ ǁĞůů ĂƐ ŽƉĞŶ ĂĐĐĞƐƐ ƉƵďůŝƐŚŝŶŐ (Gezelter, 2009). In this context t entails scientific publishing of results from 
privately funded research in public scientific outlets. 
  
However this model has the least externalities and conceivably can lead to creation of local monopolies or 
at least oligopolies if we assume that the policy instruments are effective in the first place and the subsidies 
are not distributed randomly and or evenly across value networks within the economy.  
Conclusion 
This paper presented an exploratory empirical account of incentives for underexploitation in an open 
innovation setting. The stakeholders do not exploit the resource or underexploit it, because of its 
properties as a public good. In sum, our argument is that when information or IPR is a public good between 
the co-opetitive stakeholders and the industry conditions give rise to risk of escalation of competition and 
thus extensive risk, stakeholders tend to prefer not commercializing results. These conditions then will 
induce the reverse tragedy of the commons, named so graphically, because such an event is not only costly 
in terms of time and resources, but can in fact render IPR effectively worthless in terms of commercial 
exploitation. This occurrence can effectively block innovation between the partners in the short to medium 
term. 
These propositions found support from the empirical observation of open innovation regimes set by a 
centers of excellence program
8
, branded the Strategic Centres of Science, Technology and Innovation, set 
up to bridge the gap between (basic) research and innovation within key industries in Finland.  
The main contribution of this paper is that it outlines a new phenomenon, that is important both for 
research of innovation, especially in the open innovation research stream, as well as for business and public 
policy making. Open innovation (OI) is a name coined and promoted by Chesbrough (2003) for a collection 
of ideas about information exchange and collaboration in innovation, which can be reduced to the main 
underlying argument that if enterprises would collaborate and share knowledge and thus share risk more 
readily in their research, development and innovation (RDI) they would be able to extract more value from 
their RDI.  
Recent reviews of open innovation literature, much of the research has discussed the (potential) benefits of 
open innovation in general, described cases, and tried to define the concept. In terms of the process the 
focus has been largely on the effectiveness of acquiring and integrating external knowledge to RDI 
(Dahlander & Gann, 2010; Huizingh, 2011; West & Bogers, 2011). We contribute to the nascent stream of 
governance of open innovation in organizations (Felin & Zenger, 2013), highlighting the importance of 
industry conditions in general and appropriability in particular as a determinant for open innovation 
success.  
This finding is pertinent especially for designing RDI policy measures that aim to foster collaboration. It 
seems that depending on the industry characteristics and market conditions, forcing knowledge sharing on 
partners will not have a positive effect on innovation. As for managerial implications, the findings highlight 
the need to include industry, market and technology conditions into the decision how to commit to open 
innovation.  
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